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A Pilot Study on Marital Power as
an Influence in Division of Pension
Benefits at Divorce of Long Term
MarriagesJoan M Krauskopf and Sharon Burgess Seiling"

I. INTRODUCTION
Property division at divorce ordinarily is accomplished through negotiation
of the parties and their attorneys in the "shadow of the law."' Nearly all state
laws include provisions causing retirement benefits earned during the marriage
within the marital property to be shared by the spouses when a marriage ends.2
Many anecdotal accounts indicate that pension benefits in the husband's name are
often not shared as the law envisions.'
Research data establishes that older
divorced women tend to be impoverished later in life when they can no longer
work if they do not receive private retirement benefits during a divorce.' No data
indicate(s) clearly either the extent to which women of long-term marriages fail
to receive the share of pension benefits to which they are entitled or, if they do
not, why. The authors hypothesize that women are receiving less pension benefits
than they are entitled to during a divorce because the power imbalance in
negotiation favors the husband more often than the wife.
The Hewlett Foundation on Dispute Resolution funded a small pilot project
designed by the authors to explore whether the hypothesis might be true and to
determine a methodology for more extensive research. This article explains the

* The researchers explain a dearth of information about division of pension benefits at divorce
during a time that recognition grows of the economic plight of older divorced women with no pension
benefits. This article reviews the complexity of dividing pension benefits and the literature on marital
power. In addition, the researchers describe a pilot study in which they establish both the feasibility
of a larger study and the likelihood that the imbalance of power between long term spouses results
in the wife receiving less of the pension benefits than legislators intended.
** Joan M. Krauskopf is a professor at the College of Law at The Ohio State University. Sharon
Burgess Seiling is an associate professor of family resources management at the College of Human
Ecology at The Ohio State University. They wish to thank the Hewlett Foundation on Dispute
Resolution for funding their pilot research.
1.

Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case

of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ.950 (1979).
2. Grace Blumberg, IntangibleAssets: Recognition and Valuation § 23.08, in VALUATION AND
DIsTIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY (. McCahey ed. 1994).

3. Letter from Vickie Gottlich, Staff Attorney, National Senior Citizens Law Center to Joan
Krauskopf, Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law (May 26, 1993).
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William Crown et al., The Economic Status of Divorced Older Women, Policy Center on
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applicable law, aspects of power in negotiation, the research methodology, and the
tentative findings from the project.

II. THE LAW OF PENSIONS IN PROPERTY DIVISION AT DIVORCE
A. State and FederalLaws
The "no-fault" divorce reform movement which began in California in 1970
shifted the focus of divorce from fault grounds to economic considerations,
particularly property division, as all states eventually adopted some version of
equitable distribution.' The theory underlying equitable distribution is that marital
partners each contribute to the total marriage endeavor.6 Therefore, the assets of
that partnership should be equitably distributed between them. In numerous
states, a common starting point for division of property after a long marriage is
equality. In several others, there is a presumption that the property should be
divided equally.' In fact, the Ohio legislature reformed its law to mandate equal
division unless the court finds that equality is inequitable On its face, the effect
should be an equal sharing of the marital assets after divorce of the parties in a
long term marriage.'0
Concurrently with the divorce reform movement in the states, pressures to
make pension benefits more secure for the well-being of workers and their families
resulted in the Federal Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")." ERISA's requirements made most employees' contractual rights
to pension benefits more secure. 2
During the 1980's, courts or legislatures in all states classed contractual rights
to future pension benefits as property rights. 3 In most states the pension rights,
to the extent earned during the marriage, had to be equitably distributed by the

5.

1. Ellman, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations,

Tentative Draft No. 2, 2 (The American Law Institute, Mar. 14, 1996).
6. Id.
7. Barbara Rowe & Alice Morrow, The Economic Consequencesof Divorce in Oregon After Ten
or More Years of Marriage, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 463, 472 (Spring 1988).
8. ElIman, supra note 5, at 3.
9. OwIo REV. CODE § 3105.71(C)(1) (1991).
10. Id.
11. Federal Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.

829 (codified as amended at29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974)).
12. Dale Vlasek, Chapter30-PrivateRetirement Benefits, Omo-DOMESTIC REL. LAW 764, 764
(1987); Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The Window of Vulnerability For Surviving
Spouses Under E.R.S.A., 96 IOWA L. REV. 431, 436 (1991).
13.

AMEIICAN AsSOCATION OF RETIRED PERSONS, WOMEN'S INITIATIVE, WOMEN, PENSIONS,

& DIVORCE: SMALL REFORMS THAT COULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 30 (1993) [hereinafter
A.A.R.P.]. Alabama was the last to join the parade. Ex parte Vaughn, 634 So. 2d 533 (Ala. 1993).
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court. The Ohio legislation in 1991 removed any doubts by twice specifying that
retirement benefits were property subject to division. 4
Largely in response to concerns that homemaker spouses were not adequately
sharing in pension benefits attributed to employee spouses' earnings records,
Congress passed the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA")."5 The REA
enables state courts to distribute pension benefits between spouses during a divorce
as authorized by state law, even though those benefits are otherwise controlled by
federal law.
B. Complexity of Pension Benefits and Court Power
To appreciate whether settlements or court orders properly include the value
of pension benefits requires a rudimentary understanding of this type of property
and the court's power to divide it. The researchers believe that complexity of
valuation and division itself increases the probability that pension benefits may be
divided less than equitably. Retirement benefits which a state court may divide
at divorce include both the cash value of those established by the worker
individually (such as IRAs, SRAs, or Keogh plans) and those provided as deferred
wages by either a private company or a governmental agency employer. 6 The
wide range of plans and benefits and methods of dividing them are exceedingly
complex in detail. In the study reviewed in this article, the researchers were
particularly interested in disposition of wage-earner pension benefits. However,
the scope of the study quickly expanded to include all types of retirement benefits
and other property because other property or retirement savings may have been
traded for a share of the wage-earner pension benefits during a divorce.
The two most likely benefits provided under a pension plan are the
employee's right to periodic payments after retirement (an employee annuity) and
a deceased employee's survivor's rights to survivor payments (usually a survivor's

annuity). 7

1. Employee Annuity
Two common wage earner plans for retirement annuities are defined
contribution and defined benefit plans. Under a defined contribution plan the
employer makes periodic contributions to accounts in the names of individual

14. OioREv. CODE § 3105.18(C)(1)(d) (1974); OHio REv. CODE § 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i) (1974).
15. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426; S. REP. No. 575, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. Preamble 1984; H.R. REP. No. 655, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1984); Testimony of the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, 1983: Hearings on S 19 Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1983) (statement of Judith Avner).
16. State courts have no power to divide federal Social Security retirement benefits. LAWRENCE
GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DisTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 166 (1983); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1295
(1990).
17.

Vlasek, supra note 12, at 766; MARVIN SNYDER, VALUE OF PENSIONS IN DIVORCE 17 (2d

ed. 1992).
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employees." At any one time, the value of an employee's pension rights is the
accumulated dollars in the account. 9 This value is easily divided at divorce.
Withdrawal or assignment could be made from the account, or the employee
spouse may pay other money in a lump sum or an increased share of other
property as the non-employee spouse's share."
In contrast, a defined benefit plan does not have individual accounts while
an employee works, but only promises a benefit to be determined at the time of
retirement.2 A defined benefit plan uses a formula which multiplies the number
of years worked and the amount of earnings by a pre-selected factor to determine
the annuity amount an employee will be entitled to at retirement. At the time of
divorce, courts may divide the employee rights to this future pension annuity by
determining a present value of the accrued rights and ordering a portion of it paid
to the non-employee spouse.22 Unfortunately, at any one time the present value
of those future benefits can be determined only by projecting the total amount
expected to be collected and discounting that amount for the chance of death and
an appropriate interest rate. 3 Although many courts consider all present value
evidence speculative, most courts require expert evidence to value retirement
benefits, such as actuaries or pension plan evaluators.24 The payment to
effectuate the sharing of this value could be a cash lump sum, other property, or
cash installment payments over time.25 Because the employee who must pay out
this share at divorce may die before collecting the actual pension, some courts
hesitate to use a lump sum pay-out at the time of divorce.26
Beyond an immediate division, courts may reserve jurisdiction to divide
defined benefits if and when they are actually paid to the retired employee spouse.
This division is implemented by ordering the employee to pay a portion to the exspouse as each benefit is collected during retirement. The advantage of this
method is that the risk of not collecting due to the employee's early death is
shared by both ex-spouses.2" However, many courts are reluctant to use this
method because of increased costs, difficulties of tracking and collecting from the
ex-spouse, and the desire to free both ex-spouses from contact with one another
after divorce.2"

18.
19.

SNYDER, supra note 17, at 9.
Id. at 7.

20.

Id. at 10-11.

21.
22.
23.

Id. at Chapter 4.
Id. at Chapter 17.
Vlasek, supra note 12, at 766.

24.

Hoyt, 59 N.E.2d at 1295.

25.
26.
BAR 81
27.
28.

Id.
Joan Krauskopf, Pension Benefits, Valuating andDividing at Marriage Dissolution, 40 J. Mo.
(1984); Hoyt, 59 N.E. 2d at 1298.
SNYDER, supra note 17, at 84.
Krauskopf, supra note 26; Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d at 1299.
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The third method of distribution was authorized by the REA.29 Courts may
divide the pension benefits by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO")
which assigns a portion of benefits described in the order to an alternate payee.3"
The REA specifically permits state domestic relations courts to order the pension
plan administrator to pay a portion of pension benefits, either in lump sum or
periodically in the future, to the "alternate payee" (usually the ex-spouse of the
The REA requires pension plan administrators to determine
employee).3
whether the court order is qualified and, if so, to pay the assigned benefits directly
to the alternate payee.32 If the order meets the technical requirements of the
REA, this method nearly eliminates enforcement difficulties.
2. Survivor's Benefits
The REA of 1984 also requires pension plans to provide a joint and survivor
annuity so that employees' spouses may continue to receive benefits after the death
of employee spouses. 3 Unless the spouses specifically waive this right, all wage
earner pension plans should provide a joint and survivor annuity so long as the
spouses remain married. 4
The REA authorizes QDROs at the time of divorce which assign survivor
benefits to an ex-spouse." While courts have the power to enter orders for these
survivor benefits at the time of divorce, if no benefits are ordered, they are lost.36
In other words, even though survivor's rights exist under the pension plan during
marriage, there will be none after divorce unless the court specifically orders them.
The QDRO could assure some retirement benefit payments to the survivor
by assigning both pre-retirement survivor benefits and post-retirement survivor
benefits of a joint and survivor pension annuity.37 If an employee spouse dies
while continuing to work, the pre-retirement survivor benefits will be payable at
the time the employee would have been eligible to retire. If post-retirement
annuity benefits are being shared through a QDRO assignment to the ex-spouse
as an alternate payee, the post-retirement survivor benefits would, in effect,
continue them at the death of the retiree."

29. Retirement Equity Act, supra note 15.
30. SNYDER, supra note 17, at Chapter 3.
31. 26 U.S.C. § 414(p)(4)(A)(ii) (1984).
32. SNYDER, supra note 17, at 16.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(1) (1988).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2) (1994).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(2) (1994).
36. Retirement Plans, 12 FAM. ADV. 44,46 (Winter 1990); Alan H. Kandel, Handling Retirement
Plan Benefits When a Couple Divorces, 18 ESTATE PLANNING 268 (Sept/Oct. 1991).
37. Retirement plans, supra note 36, at 46; Kandel, supra note 36, at 268.
38. Vlasek, supra note 12, at 776.
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3. Actual Outcomes and Effects of the Law
Marital status and work histories play a large role in the financial well-being
of older men and women.3 9 Divorce has resulted in dramatic declines in the
economic status of women and their children in the short term, and there is much
discussion about its role in the rising poverty rate among children.4 ° Little
attention, however, has been paid to the effects of divorce on older women in
long-term marriages whose children are grown. While younger women have
opportunities to participate in the workforce, building their own retirement
program, or to remarry and benefit from another husband's pension at retirement
age, women who divorce at a later age have fewer opportunities.4 Therefore,
the impact of divorce on women in their late forties, fifties, and sixties can be
devastating not only in the short run, but for the remainder of their lives.42
Crown, Mutschler, Schulz and Loew, in a comprehensive analysis of
economic well-being,43 found that older divorced and separated women have very
modest asset holdings and the highest poverty rates among older women. In their
review of secondary data, receipt of pension income (other than social security)
was found to be a significant determinant of the financial well-being of older
divorced women."
There are indications that the federal and state laws authorizing and
encouraging division of pension benefits at divorce are not functioning as intended.
The Clearinghouse of the Pension Rights Center ("Center") maintains a file of
reported complaints about failure to divide pensions appropriately from all over
the country.45 However, the Center reports:
Not enough hard data on matters such as the actual dollar amount
divorced wives typically receive are yet available. Many problems that
women may be facing in the state courts remain unknown because these
proceedings are not generally documented in a way that is accessible by

39.

KAREN C. HOLDEN, ECONOMIC STATUS OF OLDER WOMEN: A SUMMARY OF SELECTED

RESEARCH ISSUES, HEALTH AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF OLDER WOMEN 92-129 (A. Regula Herog et
al.
eds., 1989).
40. Gay C. Kitson & Leslie A. Morgan, The Multiple Consequences of Divorce: A Decade
Review, 52 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 913 (1990); RICHARD PETERSON, WOMEN, WORK, AND
DIVORCE (1989); LENORE WEITzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA XII (1985).
41. DIANE PASK, THE EFFECT OF FAMILY BREAKDOWN ON RETIREMENT PLANNING, IN AN
AND SOCIAL POLICY, 855, 858 (1989).
AGING WORLD' DILEM4AS AND CHALLENGES FOR L

42.

Joan Pennington,

The Economic Implications of Divorce for Older Women, 23

CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 488,489 (1989); See e.g., Lisa Wenger, DivorcedDependent Spouses'PlightLost Security: An Overview of the Problem and CurrentRemedies, 10 BIFOCAL 1 (Winter 1989/90).

43.
44.
45.

Crown et al., supra note 4.
Id. at 30.
A.A.R.P., supra note 13, at xi, 10-12.
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researchers. The future impact of several major changes made in the
federal pension laws over the last decade is still unknown."'
The staff attorney in charge of pension issues for the National Senior Citizens Law
Center responded to the researchers' inquiry:
To my knowledge, there has been no research on the extent to which
pensions and other retirement benefits are divided between divorcing
parties.... [A] study such as you propose, which reviews actual court
cases and samples divorcing parties, judges, and attorneys would not
only further the research in this area, it would greatly enhance the work
I do.47
The authors' searches discovered only very limited empirical data on pension
distribution in the three studies described below. The studies did not review
pension distribution in detail; they had a small number of cases which included
pensions and involved cases filed before the REA was in effect. However, the
findings are consistent with the anecdotal accounts.
The oldest of these studies is an Oregon study of divorce settlements in
which one hundred and sixteen interviews revealed that in seventy-nine cases
involving pensions, the couple determined values of the property in two-thirds of
the cases.4 Most of the parties had no idea what the values of the pensions
were. Two-thirds of the cases went to trial with no value determined, and in only
three court orders did wives share in the husband's pension benefits.49 The
second study is a review of all economic issues reflected in selected court decrees
in New York.50 Although there were very few court records listing pensions,
women appeared to have shared only ten percent of pensions.
The third study investigated occurrences of dividing the property by
apportioning the assets as intact pieces in such a way as to balance the value
between the parties. The researcher found pattern of the distribution of property
by gender, regardless of the dispute resolution forum or income level. 5" Women
consistently received household goods and jewelry, while their spouses got
pensions and other retirement plans, family businesses, securities, land, and
recreational vehicles. Divorcing couples' homes, vehicles, cash and bank accounts
were divided roughly equally with no gender-related pattern. Although wives
reported receiving fifty-two percent of property on average, the authors believe the
effect of this pattern is clear: the wives were getting assets which had little

46. Id. at 34.
47. Gottlich letter, supra note 3.
48. Rowe & Morrow, supra note 7, at 471.
49. Id. at 474.
50. Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable
Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621, 626 (1991).
51. Jessica Pearson, The Equity of Mediated Divorce Agreements, 9 MEDIATION Q. 179, 187
(1991).
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potential for growth in value. Men were receiving assets, including pensions,
which produced income or would likely grow in value.
Divorce is becoming an increasingly important avenue for transfer of
property. In fact, "more wealth in our society is transferred through divorce today
than through the traditional paths of inheritance via trusts and estate routes of
yesteryears." 2 Because the right to a pension benefit earned by a wage earner
spouse during a long-term marriage is often the most valuable asset of the
marriage, how those rights are identified, valued, and distributed between the
parties may substantially affect the future economic well-being of the former
spouses.
Since pensions and other retirement benefits have only recently become well
recognized as marital property available for distribution at divorce, patterns of
practice may be changing. Greater awareness of the importance of retirement
benefits to long-term financial well-being on the part of divorcing spouses may
increase the frequency of attorneys and judges considering retirement benefits an
important asset in a divorce. Understanding the patterns of distribution of these
assets and their impact on the divorcing parties is important to assessing the future
financial well-being of older divorced women. The extent of actual sharing also
is directly relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of state and federal statutes and
whether Congress should mandate automatic distribution. On February 24, 1995
Representative Barbara Kennelly introduced the Pension Reform Act of 1995
("PRA"), which called for automatic equal sharing of the marital portion of
pensions subject to ERISA if the divorce court did not provide otherwise."
Even though a greater awareness of retirement benefits as property exists, the
dynamics between the spouses in settling their economic affairs may affect the
ability to adequately consider and share complex property interests, including
pension benefits. Therefore, power emanating from negotiation resources should
be a critical factor affecting implementation of the equitable distribution laws and
the economic condition of persons divorced after a long-term marriage.

III. THE DIVORCE SETrLEMENT PROCESS AND CONCEPTS OF POWERS
The legal issues involved in an equitable distribution of property concern: (1)
identification of property subject to division; (2) valuation of the divisible
property; and (3) the determination of equitable or fair distribution of the property.
Parties negotiate these issues in the "shadow of the law." "' In other words, legal
rules and perceptions of those rules by judges who allocate marital funds, by
attorneys who advise and advocate for the parties, and by the parties themselves,

52. Joseph Ducanto, A Modem Divorce Tale: Splitting the Blanket in the 90's, 130 TR. AND
EST. 57 (1991).
53. H.R. Doc. No. 1048, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
54. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1.
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influence the outcome of negotiation. However, the legal shadow does not fall on
parties equally able to negotiate.
A. Power Resources
Divorcing parties negotiate distribution of pension benefits within a marital
relationship and legal environment in which the parties have varying degrees of
power. Power is the ability of a person to influence another as the person
One's negotiating power is derived from his or her possession of
wishes."
tangible and intangible resources that affect that person's ability to influence the
negotiation. 6 Therefore, the outcome of negotiation is largely dependent on the
resources available to each divorcing party which influence the process, i.e., each
person's respective power. 7
The study of power in divorce settlement differs from most other family
power studies in that divorce is the culmination of the family relationships as they
58
Unlike many
have existed, but the decisions affect the parties' future lives.
who know
parties
involves
divorce
processes,
other negotiation venues and legal
years,
for
many
relationship
each other well, who may have been in an intimate
divorce
In
fact,
one
another.
to
relating
of
ways
set
and who have established
mediators find that couples' patterns of relating to each other are so well
established that one spouse can control both the process and the outcome of
communication. 9 Therefore, although the parties are involved intensely in the
present struggle and vitally interested in the future, they also are very much
anchored in the past.' Their past together may create or reinforce the different
degrees of power between them.
1. Effect of Social Values and Alternatives
Value norms or the societal structural contexts in which people operate also
affect their perception of power. An individual's power within a marital, family
or group relationship is influenced by the societal expectations associated with
his/her positions in the social system.6' Both powerful and powerless persons

55.

BERTRAM H. RAVEN ET AL., The Bases of Conjugal Power, in POWER IN FAMILIES 217

(Ronald Cromwell & David Olson eds., 1975); JOHN HAYNES, Power Balancing, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 277 (J. Fohlberg & A. Milne eds., 1988).
56. Id.
57.

Supra note 55.

58. Sharon J. Price & Patrick C. McKenry, ChapterSeven-Economics of Divorce, DIVORCE 107,
108 (1988).
59. HAYNES, supra note 55, at 277, 290.
60. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Some Wise andMistaken Assumptions About Conflict and Negotiation,46
J. OF Soc. IssuEs 195 (1989); HAY4ES, supra note 55, at 282.
61. Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation andthe Politics ofPower, 40 BUFF.
L. REV. 441, 447 (1992); JEAN LIPMAN-BLUMEN, GENDER ROLFS AND POWER 14 (1984); Gerald W.

McDonald, Family Power: The Assessment of a Decade of Theory and Research, 1970-1979, 42 J. OF
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take this system for granted,6 to the point that it may be invisible to the people
involved.63
Social status, or the societal importance placed on positions and roles, makes
income, occupation, and education part of a person's social power base.' For
example, the role of a family's provider brings with it legitimized authority over
a variety of family decisions.65
Furthermore, income, occupation and education are positively related to one's
alternatives to the marital relationship.66 Because of societal gender role
ideologies favoring women as homemakers and men as providers, income,
occupation and education are gender related. 67 Typically, the male invests more
of his time in employment activities to carry out the provider role as his main
family role.68 Many women invest significant time and effort in family and
69
As
homemaking activities, while limiting other education and career options.
alternatives
more
with
husband
the
provide
investments
those
the years pass,
outside the marriage, and the wife with fewer. Since alternatives outside the
marriage are resources that increase power within the relationship, the differing
marital roles increase his power and reduce her power over time. Thus, normative
social values have a gender effect?0
2. Effect of Specific Characteristics
Socially created power alone is not enough to determine any individual's
power in a particular situation.7 Group characteristics and those of individual
72
Power is the property
persons involved have more ability to affect outcome.
of particular individuals within specific relationships, and even though it has roots
in a structural or social context shared by many others, it is not easily transferred

MARRIAGE AND THE FAm. 111, 116 (1980); MAXIMILIANE E. SZINOVACZ, HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY 651, 661 (Marvin B. Sussman & Suzanne K. Steinmetz eds., 1987).
62. LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 61, at 14.
63. Aafke Komter, Hidden Power in Marriage, 3 GENDER AND SOc'Y 187, 192 (1989); S.
LuKES, A RADICAL VIEW 24 (1974).
64.

JOHN R.P. FRENCH & BERTRAM RAVEN,

STUDIEs IN SOCIAL POWER, 160 (Cartwright &

Dorwin eds., 1959); SzINOvACz, supra note 61, at 661-62.
65. FRENCH & RAVEN, supra note 64, at 150, 159-60; SZINOVACZ, supra note 61, at 661.
66.

JOHN ScANzONI, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON HUSBAND-WIFE BARGAINING POWER AND

MARITAL DISSOLuTION 30 (Levinger & Moles eds., 1979).
67. Bryan, supra note 61, at 449.
69.

ROBErT S. WEISS, STAYING THE COURSE- THE EMOTIONAL AND SOCIAL LIVES OF MEN WHo

Do WELL AT WORK (1990).
69. VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 58-74 (1988); Elizabeth Landes,
Economics of Alimony, 7 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 35, 40 (1978).
70. Bryan, supra note 61, at 447; LIPMAN-BLUMEN, supra note 61, at 14.
71. SzINOvACZ, supra note 61, at 665.
72. Id.
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characteristics bring
to other relationships. 3 Individual and specific group
74
specificity to power exertions, and are power resources.
Scholars describe power resources as tangible or intangible. 75 Tangible
resources are ones that can be objectively measured.76 Money is the most
obvious. Among married couples, men equate money (or the ability to earn
money) with power, even in the home.77 Income contributed to the marriage by
the parties and wealth accumulated prior to or during the marriage are sources of
power. 78 Education and occupation are tangible resources, which not only
contribute to social status on their own but also affect earning capacity. 79 These
resources convey power outside of marriage and provide alternatives to marriage
for those possessing them. °
Examples of intangible resources of power include: level of commitment or
dependence by one person on another, personality and attractiveness, gender, age,
self-concept, cognitive and persuasive ability, knowledge and expertise, dominance,
power to coerce or reward, and emotional state."'
B. Effect of attorney representation
The factor of legal representation further complicates the issue of power in
negotiation between divorcing spouses. The attorney in the divorce process is the
negotiating agent and advisor for the divorcing spouse. Because divorcing parties
generally have little knowledge of the legal system, especially concerning technical
matters such as dividing pension benefits, representation by an attorney is an
important way to enhance a party's power in achieving a desired outcome.82
This is particularly true for women because of their less powerful position, and
their greater likelihood of giving in to coercive threats. 3
Studies of child support before and after the implementation of specific
guidelines have found that attorney representation and judicial variation were

73. JOHN HAYNES, supra note 55, at278; McDonald, supra note 61, at 113; RE. CRoMWELL Er
AL., Family Power: A Multi-trait-MultimethodAnalysis, in POwER FAMILIEs 151 (R. Cromwell & D.
Olson eds., 1975); SZINOVACZ, supra note 61, at 653.
74. McDonald, supra note 61, at 113-14.
75. Bryan, supra note 61, at 447.
76. Id.
77.

PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK AND SEX 53

(1983).
78. Id.
79. Bryan, supra note 61, at 447.
80. ScANZONI, supra note 66, at 30.
81. Bryan, supra note 61, at 457; FRENCH & RAVEN, supra note 64, at 160; McDonald, supra
note 61, at 113; Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, The Study ofFamily Power Structure: A Review 19601969, 31 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 539, 552 (1960); Sz-NOvAcZ, supra note 61, at 665.
82. Austin Saratand & William F.L. Felstiner, Law Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20
LAw AND STRATEGY REV. 99 (1986).
83. Bryan, supra note 61, at 462; Barbara J. Lonsdorf, Coercion: A FactorAffecting Women's
Inferior FinancialOutcome in Divorce, 3 AM. J. FAM. L. 282 (1989).
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related to variability in support awarded. 4 In looking at child support awards
after the implementation of the guidelines, one study found that attorneys'
experiences were positively related to the custodial mothers' award of child
support.8 5 Another study of child support awards before and after the Ohio
guidelines went into effect found that attorney representation for the wife and for
both parties increased the probability of an award of child support to the custodial
mother over the probability of award in cases in which only the husband had
representation.!6 Studies in Florida, Colorado, and Ohio also have shown
variability by judges in awards of child support for cases which were similar in
income and number of children. 7
Divorcing parties typically enter into the legal process with little
understanding of it.88 Thus, for them the rules and the process must be
interpreted by their attorney. In fact, much of the conversation between attorney
and divorcing client is educational, with the pattern remaining consistent regardless
The
of experience, type of practice or specialization of the attorney.89
of
lawyers
to
that
a
level
similar
often
at
occurs
conversation
educational
interacting with each other, so the client does not receive much clarification or
translation.9" Additionally, "law talk" occurs frequently because of the inquiry
of the client rather than a voluntary offer from the attorney." Krauskopf and
Seiling conclude that such findings indicate that even when divorcing parties have
legal representation, they must exert power to require the attorney to play a more
meaningful role in educating them and in advocating strongly to further their best
interests.
Unfortunately, parties of lesser power may not have the ability to hire or to
continue to pay the attorney who could best represent them. For a variety of
reasons, including the possibility of not being paid, Krauskopf and Seiling
speculate that attorneys for persons with less power going into the negotiating
process may not intervene in such a way as to balance the power, particularly

84. Walter L. Ellis, The Effects of Background Characteristicsof Attorneys and Judges on
decisionMaking in Domestic Relations Court:An Analysis of ChildSupportAwards, 16 J. OF DIVORCE
AND REMARRIAGE 107-19 (1991); Kathryn Stafford et al., The Effects of Child SupportGuidelines: An
Analysis of the Evidence in Court Records, 11 LIFESTYLES: FAMILY AND ECONOMIC ISsUES 361-81
(1990); Kenneth R White & Thomas R. Stone, A Study ofAlimony and Child Support Rulings With
Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. LAW Q. 75-91 (1976); Lucy Yee, What Really Happens in Child
Support Cases: An EmpiricalStudy of Establishmentand Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the
Denver District Court, 21 DENV. U. L. REV. 65 (1979).
85. Ellis, supra note 84, at 112.
86. Stafford et al., supra note 84. Representation was not significant for the amount of child
support awarded. Income was not available from the court records, so the researchers could not
consider it. Id.
87. White & Stone, supra note 84; Yee, supra note 84; Ellis, supra note 84.
88. Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 1603, 1672 (1989).
89. Id. at 1670.
90. Id. at 1672.
91. Id. at 16"70.
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concerning complex issues such as pension benefits. Complaints to the Pension
Rights Center regarding failure to divide pensions appropriately indicate that
attorneys have not mastered the complexity of the basic law they should know
and, thus, fail to obtain benefits for their clients.92 Results from the New York
and Oregon studies, discussed earlier, also raise doubts about whether pensions
were considered fully by attorneys and judges.93
The sparse information about division of pension benefits is consistent with
sociological studies showing that attorneys in divorce matters tend to push clients
to settle quickly and delegate decision-making to them." Without attorney
advocacy to change the power relations between the parties, employed spouses
(husbands) are likely to exert greater power than their wives over economic
matters.95

IV. AuTHoRs'

HYPOTHESES PRIOR TO DATA COLLECTION

Previous research and data have not indicated what ramifications power has
on property division as a result of negotiation. No empirical research is reported
on this specific topic. However, one could predict that by virtue of social status,
the spouse employed for the longer time and in the higher status occupation would
have more power during the divorce negotiation process. This would seem likely
unless that power were ameliorated by greater intangible power resources exerted
by the other. The other's power could stem from greater resources, such as
information in financial matters, dominance, self-esteem, or representation by an
attorney.
The hypothesis was that husbands would more often than not retain most of
the value of their pensions and that wives would not receive commensurate value
for the distributional share to which state and federal laws entitle them because of
power factors favoring husbands. In other words, the authors believed that human
behavior transforms the law into outcomes divergent from those policy makers
sought when creating the law.
A. The Pilot Research Project
The law of Ohio requires inclusion of retirement benefits earned during the
marriage in marital property, presumptively mandates an equal division of marital
property, and authorizes indefinite spousal support for a spouse of a long term
marriage whose earning capacity has been adversely affected by service to the

92.
93.
94.
95.

A.A.R.P., supra note 13, at 10-12.
Garrison, supra note 50; Rowe & Morrow, supra note 7.
Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 88, at 1680.
Lonsdorf, supra note 83, at 283.
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marriage.96 The pilot study, explored in this article, was designed to gather
preliminary data on the pattern of marital property division for couples in longterm marriages and the incidence of inclusion of pension/retirement benefits in
property division. Furthermore, the research sought to explore the role of marital
power as a determinant of divorce property division.
To establish a data base, law students recorded basic data about every
dissolution and divorce97 filed in Franklin County, Ohio, during the year 1992.
They recorded as complete information as possible about the economic awards for
all marriages of twenty years or more in which no minor children were residing
in a parental home. Over 6,300 court files were read and recorded, 5,240 of
which were divorce cases that were completed and available. Of those,
approximately ten percent involved marriages of over twenty years, and of those,
just over half (5.7 percent) had no minor children at home.
Since negotiation determines how the legal rights and responsibilities will be
translated into action, it was important to interview one or both divorced parties
to determine what exchanges or trade-offs had been made for pension benefits and
what role marital power played in the settlement outcome. As the court records
were collected, students searched the phone directory for current addresses and
phone numbers of the parties. The parties who could be found were called to
confirm that they were the persons being sought. A brief description of the study
was given over the phone, and the callers asked whether the parties would be
willing to receive a letter about the study. A week or ten days after they received
the letter they were contacted again about participating in the study. Twenty-five
divorced parties, including both husband and wife from two cases (for a total of
twenty-three cases involved), agreed to participate in the study. After getting the
designated number for the pilot study, no more contacts for interviews were made.
Graduate students, conducted the interviews under the supervision of Professor
Seiling, using a qualitative interview protocol. At the time of the interview, the
subjects also completed a scale in written form, Hoskin's Perceived DominanceAccommodation Scale.98 Information about their (and their former spouse's) age,
income, and occupation was also requested in written form.
The interviewees ranged in age at divorce from forty-one to seventy-two,
with an average age of fifty-two years. The parties had been married an average
of twenty-nine years, with the length of marriage ranging from twenty to fortynine years. There were nine males and sixteen females in the sample. Our sample
included men and women with varied incomes and asset portfolios. Pre-divorce
household incomes ranged from $25,000 to $375,000. There were a variety of

96. OHwo REv. CODE §§ 3105.17.1(C)(1), 3105.18(C)(1) (1991); Kunkle v. Kunkle, 554 N.E.2d
83 (1990).

97. In Ohio, a dissolution is granted when both parties seek to end the marriage and agree on all
aspects of economic settlement, but a divorce which requires establishing grounds for divorce must be
used when the parties have not agreed on all the economic terms.
98.
Carol N. Hoskins, Measuring Perceived Dominance-Accommodation: Development of a
Scale, 58 PSYCHOL. REP. 627-42 (1986).
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patterns in property division, income sharing, use of attorneys, knowledge of and
competence in financial and legal matters, and marital power.
Because pension benefits may be included in a trade of assets when the
property settlement is being developed, it was important to analyze the fairness of
overall property division. The researchers independently assessed the extent to
which (1) the property was equally divided; (2) the property division included
retirement benefits; and (3) the disparity in the parties' earning capacities was
lessened by a combination of the property division and spousal support. The
property division for each case was judged by each investigator using a sliding
scale point system representing good, fair and poor. Eleven cases were judged
good, five cases judged fair and seven cases judged poor, based on the three
factors described above and using relative equality as the primary criterion. Of
the twenty-three cases, just under half were classified as a good property division.
An important part of the study was to determine whether the power
relationship between the parties that existed during the marriage influenced the
bargaining during the divorce process and, thus, the resulting property division.
One aspect of marital power was measured through use of Hoskin's Perceived
Dominance-Accommodation Scale. The interviewees completed the scale,
recalling the interaction with their spouses during their marriage. The scale covers
a variety of spheres of the marital relationship, including work, relations with
friends and relatives, money, sex, affection, shared values and use of leisure
Because the scale measures a person's perception of dominating or
time."
accommodating behavior with their marital partner, there may be inconsistencies
between perception and actual experience of dominance."° Furthermore, the
recall of marital relations after divorce is somewhat problematic. It is, however,
hoped that the relative length of the marriage compared to the time elapsed since
divorce will provide for an adequate recall of the relationship between the
partners.
Possible scores on the Perceived Dominance-Accommodation Scale ranged
from thirty to 150, with a midpoint of ninety. Scores at the high and low ends are
indicative of power imbalance, with scores at the midpoint reflecting more equal
power. Accommodating partners scored high, and dominating partners had low
scores. The twenty-five respondents' scores on the dominance scale were ranked
from one to twenty-five, the highest having a score of one and the lowest, twentyfive. The cases had been sorted into good, fair and poor groups with regard to the
equality of their overall division of property (see discussion above). The
Perceived Dominance-Accommodation scores of respondents from the cases which
had been classified in the good group had a mean rank of 11.5, those from cases
classified fair had a mean rank of 9.1, and those from cases classified poor had a

99. Id.
100. Id.
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mean rank of 18. The Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA' °' was performed on the
three groups.
B. Results
1. Marital Power
The Kruskal-Wallis test showed that the groups of cases judged to be
different on the basis of equality in property division, also scored differently on
the dominance scale, significant at the .05 level. Examination of the scores of the
groups indicates strongly that power between the husband and wife in negotiation
accounts for the differences. The mean ranks of respondents' dominance scores
ranged from closest to the middle for the GOOD property division group to
furthest from the middle for the POOR property division group. It is apparent that
the group with the most equal power balance was also the group that was
determined to be most equitable in division of property. Although the results from
a sample of twenty-five interviewees cannot be conclusive, this is valuable
evidence that a relationship exists between marital power and equality of the final
property division between spouses at divorce.
2. Legal Counsel
An important question arises about the role of the legal system in divorce
negotiation -- can the marital power relationship be moderated through use of legal
procedures and/or hiring an attorney to represent one's interests in the divorce
process? The resources that an attorney can bring to the party include knowledge
of the law, legal procedures, and judicial preferences; knowledge of financial
matters including pension plans and their division options; and assertiveness in
making the case for the client. 2 These resources may be especially helpful to
one who has been in an accommodating role relative to the opposing party in a
bargaining situation or to one who may be distraught or in shock as a result of the
divorce proceedings.
In seventy-two percent of cases rated good in property division both
divorcing parties had attorneys, compared to sixty percent for those rated fair, and
twenty-nine percent for those with a poor rating. This distribution of legal
representation among the three groups indicates that attorneys may moderate
marital power in the divorce settlement process. With a larger sample, one could
statistically test whether attorney representation intervenes to temper a power
imbalance and to achieve a more equal settlement.

101. ANOVA is an abbreviation for analysis of variance. The Kruskal-Wallis test is used for
comparing differences among independent samples from populations which have the same distribution.
MARIJA J. NoRusls/ SPSS, INC., SPSS FOR WINDOWS BASE SYSTEM USER'S GUIDE, RELEASE 6.0 289
(1993).
102. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 82, at 99; LONSDORF, supra note 83, at 282.
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Of the twenty-three cases, thirteen had attorney representation for both
parties, six had only representation for the wife, three had only representation for
the husband, and one case had no attorney. Two cases involved use of an attorney
by one party for advice prior to or during the preparation of the case without
retaining the attorney for preparing documents or presenting the case. In one case,
the divorcing husband was a practicing attorney. His wife hired another attorney,
early in the process, to inform her of "her rights" and to investigate "facts about
their assets." The wife, however, relied on her attorney husband to guide her "in
what he thought was the right direction."
There were very mixed feelings on the part of the respondents about the
usefulness of attorneys, how well the parties felt they were served, the respect and
caring accorded them, and the cost of legal counsel. The cases considered good
in terms of fairness of property division had varied attorney input. In four cases,
the couples themselves worked out most of the settlement before taking it to an
attorney. The respondent felt that he or she received good advice from the
attorney on financial matters in three cases. The women in two cases were very
knowledgeable about financial matters and had a major role in setting the terms
of their property divisions. In one case, the judge spelled out what would be an
acceptable property division.
Those situations that received a fair score in property settlement were also
mixed. One case involved the respondent's wife setting the terms regarding
finances, with the respondent not using an attorney. In another case, the
respondent did not follow her attorney's advice to ask for more property. And
finally, in a third case, the respondent did not feel that she was adequately
represented by her attorney.
Six cases resulted in a poor property division. The cases included: one
having no attorney; one in which the husband was an attorney and the wife
accepted his terms; one in which the wife set the terms and her attorney merely
carried out her instructions; two in which the couple reached agreement before
going to an attorney; and one in which the respondent did not feel that he had
adequate representation, with the attorney telling him what the judge would "give
his wife."
3. Type of Marital Dissolution
A part of the power structure within which parties bargain is the divorce law
of the state and the judicial preferences expressed by individual judges.' 3 In
Ohio, the law permits two distinct ways to dissolve a marriage: divorce and
dissolution. Under dissolution, the parties agree between themselves and present
their decision to a judge, who accepts it if she believes they have made the
decision without coercion."° The divorce procedure contains the possibility of

103.
104.

Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 82, at 102.
OHIo REV. CODE §§ 3105.64-.65 (1991).
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one party contesting the divorce, providing a legally sanctioned bargaining tool for
the parties to use.'0 5
In the study, divorce was the procedure used by sixty-four percent of cases
rated good, forty percent of cases rated fair, and fourteen percent of cases rated
poor. Krauskopf and Seiling concluded when divorcing parties' power is unequal,
their use of dissolution reinforces the imbalance between them and may have the
result of very unequal distribution of marital property. This inequality is reflected
in the predominant use of dissolution by parties who had a poor property
settlement and their greater power imbalance measured by mean rank on the
Perceived Dominance-Accommodation Scale.
The authors' research also showed there was an interaction between
procedure used and use of legal counsel. Eleven cases of the twenty-three
involved dissolution, and twelve cases used the divorce procedure. In all but one
of the divorce cases, both parties had legal counsel. In two cases, the couples
tried to work out a settlement prior to engaging attorneys; one on their own using
dissolution and one through mediation. In both cases, a settlement could not be
reached through those means. Therefore, the couples hired attorneys and went
through the divorce proceedings.
Preliminary results indicate that the power imbalance between parties who
had unequal property division may not be entirely offset by use of the divorce
procedure or by hiring an attorney. There appears to be evidence of a relationship
between marital power and division of property that is not completely ameliorated
by use of legal power resources. Further research is needed to establish the
interaction between marital power in force prior to and during the divorce process
and the role of the attorney in representing the parties. Can legal counsel
overcome, at least to some extent, the imbalance of marital power within which
the parties go into the negotiation process? Does the use of the divorce procedure
protect the less powerful party during the divorce settlement negotiations?
4. Complexity of Property: Pension/Retirement Benefits
Of the twenty-three cases, twenty had retirement benefits. Three of those did
not consider them in divorce negotiations, and seventeen included them in the
marital property to be divided. Of the seventeen with retirement benefits, ten
scored good on property division. In two cases, the pension was not shared
because the pension earner refused to have it considered (according to the
respondents) -- one case involved the wife, and the other, the husband.
Retirement benefits were held by both parties in seven cases, by husbands
only in ten cases, and by wives only in three cases. The remaining three cases had
no current pension benefits for either party. Husbands retired and were drawing
retirement benefits in five cases.
Among those cases with the husband only having retirement benefits, the
wife was awarded none of the value in three cases, sixty percent in two cases, fifty

105.
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percent in two cases and twenty-five percent in one case. The husband received
none of the wife's retirement benefits in all three cases in which the wife was the
only pension holder. For those cases in which both parties had retirement benefits,
the wife was awarded none of the husband's benefits in three cases (in two cases
all of the benefits were awarded to the husband and specific other assets were
awarded to the wife in trade), in two cases was awarded one of multiple pensions
or retirement account, and in two cases was awarded fifty percent of the pension
benefits. One case involved the husband sharing his pension, but the amount and
proportion were unknown.
Five of the twenty-three cases involved the retirement of the husband prior
to the divorce, and in one of these cases the wife was retiring at the time of
divorce. An additional case involved the retirement of the husband simultaneously
to the divorce. In two of the six cases involving a husband who had retired prior
to or at divorce, both parties had retirement benefits, and for the remaining four,
the husband alone had retirement benefits. Of all the cases involving a husband
who had retired prior to or at divorce, only one-third of the awards included
shared retirement benefits. This compares to more than half (fifty-seven percent)
of those in which the husband had not retired who shared retirement benefits with
the spouse.
One question to be pursued is whether there is a pattern of differential
sharing of pension benefits between groups of spouses who have retired and those
who have not. The law makes no distinction between division of the retirement
benefits before and after retirement of the pension holder. It is unclear whether
the pension holders, their spouses, the attorneys, and the judges view the
circumstances differently, and thus view the property division differently.
5. Discussion
Findings from interviews of the sample of twenty-five divorcing parties lend
support to the assertion that "power relations within marriage, and the way that
couples negotiated while still married, will affect the way in which they deal with
the issues which arise on separation."' °6 Gwynn Davis, Stephen Gretney and
Jean Collins followed divorcing couples and their solicitors through the divorce
process in England, and although they did not use the Perceived DominanceAccommodation Scale to assess power, they came to the conclusion that marital
power is an important factor in divorce negotiations. 7 Results of the authors'
pilot study support Davis, Gretney and Collins contention by finding a statistical
relationship between marital power, measured through dominance/accommodation,
and equality of property settlement. More study in this area is needed to inform
the policy debate regarding pension distribution at divorce and to provide attorneys
and financial counselors with a better understanding of the complexity of the
issues that parties bring to divorce proceedings. A larger sample would provide
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a broader base upon which to measure the relationship between marital power and
divorce settlements.
The role of the attorney in moderating a marital power imbalance to achieve
a balanced settlement is unclear. Divorcing parties and the legal system are likely
to have different approaches to the resolution of the dispute. The parties may find
it difficult to "see the logic or justice which their legal advisor assures them is
there." 8 Furthermore, divorcing parties often speak a different language and
operate in a different culture.'O Divorcing parties, who have had no experience
with legal action and who have not been assertive in their interactions with others,
may be afraid to hire an attorney or be unable to get the best advice or advocacy
from one. Some divorcing parties in the study felt that they did not receive
adequate legal representation, others were not prepared to take the advice given.
Other parties in the study believed they had very good legal counsel.
6. Pensions/Retirement Benefits
A survey of the court record data indicates that the cases in the authors' study
were divided almost equally into three groups: those with no pension benefits,
those which had pension coverage for one of the parties (a large majority of whom
are the husbands), and those which had pension coverage for both parties. For
those parties with pension/retirement benefits, there are indications that divorcing
parties, attorneys, and judges are considering pension benefits in the division of
marital property. Even in those cases in which the benefits were not part of the
divorce settlement, the interviewees were aware that retirement benefits are part
of marital property. Some of the parties, however, were not successful in sharing
the benefits even though they wanted them to be shared.
The fairness of the sharing appears to be of greater concern to the parties
than the mere sharing of retirement benefits. Among the cases from the court
records in which both parties have pension/retirement benefits, over eighty percent
of the parties were awarded his/her own benefits. In most of those cases, there
was no valuing of the benefit -- it may have appeared to the parties that the easiest
way for equal division of the pension/retirement benefits to occur was for each
party to keep his/her own earned benefits. No equality of value should be implicit
in this form of division as the small evidence available from those which were
valued indicates most pensions earned by the husbands were much greater in value
than those earned by wives. The complexity of the methods of sharing and the
additional time and expertise needed to complete the paperwork necessary for
approval of a QDRO work against those with less knowledge, assertiveness, and
ability to pay for legal services. Divorcing parties may not be getting adequate
advice on valuation of the pension assets for immediate division and on methods
of future sharing by QDRO. Thus, patterns of sharing appear ad hoc or random.

DAVIS ET AL., supra note 106, at 72.
Id.See also JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 60 (1990).
108.
109.
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With a larger sample, the researchers could compare advice or knowledge of
financial and legal issues with method and extent of pension sharing to answer the
questions of whether the more complex and difficult-to-divide property is taken
by the more powerful party.
During the authors' study, interview data revealed an avenue to explore
regarding possibly divergent sharing patterns between those whose pensions are
being paid out post-retirement and those for whom the pension is an accumulating
asset to be collected at a later date. Although the law does not distinguish
between pre- and post-retirement pension benefits, the parties themselves may
view them differently, i.e., an asset versus an income stream. The present reality
of receiving payments versus the future uncertainty may also make the two
situations appear very different. There is a need for further research into the
details of the division of pension/retirement benefits at divorce with regard to the
retirement status of the pension holder.

V. CONCLUSION

Evidence from the authors' study indicates that divorcing parties, attorneys
and judges generally consider pension/retirement benefits in divorce decisions.
There are also indications that equitable division of complex property such as
pension benefits may not always occur. Patterns of sharing appear ad hoc or
random. This pilot study demonstrated a statistical relationship between long-term
spouses' marital power, measured through dominance/accommodation, and the
fairness of their divorce settlement. Preliminary indications are that use of legal
counsel and specific legal procedures may ameliorate the power imbalance
between divorcing parties. More exploration of marital power as it relates to
attorney variables, parties' satisfaction with the settlement, and the actual
settlement itself is needed to understand more fully its impact on the ultimate
outcomes. In particular, this pilot study indicates that attorneys play a coaching
role rather than a direct negotiator role in many divorce settlement processes. The
possibility that attorney as advisor and coach can change power imbalance needs
thorough study both for its impact on direct party negotiations and on mediated
settlements.
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